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Abstract
Identifying the best arm of a multi-armed bandit is a central problem in bandit optimization.
We study a quantum computational version of this problem with coherent oracle access to states
encoding the reward probabilities of each arm as quantum amplitudes. Specifically, we show
that we can find the best arm with fixed confidence using O˜
(√∑
n
i=2
∆−2
i
)
quantum queries,
where ∆i represents the difference between the mean reward of the best arm and the i
th-best
arm. This algorithm, based on variable-time amplitude amplification and estimation, gives a
quadratic speedup compared to the best possible classical result. We also prove a matching
quantum lower bound (up to poly-logarithmic factors).
1 Introduction
The multi-armed bandit (MAB) model is one of the most fundamental settings in reinforcement
learning. This simple scenario captures crucial issues such as the tradeoff between exploration
and exploitation. Furthermore, it has wide applications to areas including operations research,
mechanism design, and statistics.
A basic challenge about multi-armed bandits is the problem of best-arm identification, where
the goal is to efficiently identify the arm with the largest expected reward. This problem captures
a common difficulty in practical scenarios, where at unit cost, only partial information about the
system of interest can be obtained. A real-world example is a recommendation system, where
the goal is to find appealing items for users. For each recommendation, only feedback on the
recommended item is obtained. In the context of machine learning, best-arm identification can
be viewed as a high-level abstraction and core component of active learning, where the goal is to
minimize the uncertainty of an underlying concept, and each step only reveals the label of the data
point being queried.
Quantum computing is a promising technology with potential applications to diverse areas
including cryptanalysis, optimization, and simulation of quantum physics. Quantum computing
devices have recently been demonstrated to experimentally outperform classical computers on a
specific sampling task [8]. While noise limits the current practical usefulness of quantum comput-
ers, they can in principle be made fault tolerant and thus capable of executing a wide variety of
algorithms. It is therefore of significant interest to understand quantum algorithms from a theoret-
ical perspective to anticipate future applications. In particular, there has been increasing interest
∗Equal contribution.
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in quantum machine learning (see for example the surveys [6, 12, 19, 40]). In this paper, we study
best-arm identification in multi-armed bandits, establishing quantum speedup.
Problem setup. We work in a standard multi-armed bandit setting [24] in which the MAB has n
arms, where arm i ∈ [n] := {1, . . . , n} is a Bernoulli random variable taking value 1 with probability
pi and value 0 with probability 1− pi. Each arm can therefore be regarded as a coin with bias pi.
As our algorithms and lower bounds are symmetric with respect to the arms, we assume without
loss of generality that p1 ≥ · · · ≥ pn, and denote ∆i := p1 − pi for all i ∈ {2, . . . , n}. We further
assume that p1 > p2, i.e., the best arm is unique. Given a parameter δ ∈ (0, 1), our goal is to use
as few queries as possible to determine the best arm with probability ≥ 1 − δ. This is known as
the fixed confidence setting. We primarily characterize complexity in terms of the parameter
H :=
n∑
i=1
1
∆2i
(1.1)
which arises in the analysis of classical MAB algorithms (as discussed below).
We consider a quantum version of best-arm identification in which we can access the arms
coherently. More precisely, we assume we have access to a quantum oracle O that acts as
O : |i〉I |0〉B 7→ |i〉I |coin pi〉B ∀ i ∈ [n], where |coin p〉 :=
√
p |1〉 +
√
1− p |0〉 (1.2)
for any p ∈ [0, 1]. Register I is the “index” register with n states that correspond to the n
arms. Register B is the single-qubit “bandit” register with two states, |1〉 corresponding to a
reward and |0〉 corresponding to no reward. For convenience, we omit register labels when this
causes no confusion. Compared to pulling an arm classically—which can be implemented using O
by simply measuring the bandit register—the quantum oracle enables accessing different arms in
superposition, an essential feature enabling the possibility of quantum speedup.
Previous work on quantum algorithms for clustering [32, 41] and reinforcement learning [19, 21]
has discussed how to instantiate an oracle similar to1 O. In clustering, O is created using the SWAP
test where for each i, pi encodes the distance between some fixed vector and the i
th vector in some
collection. Our algorithm can be used to speed up the algorithms of Refs. [32, 41]. In reinforcement
learning, O naturally appears in stochastic agent environments; for instance, O can be viewed as a
special case of the oracle in [21] for a Markov decision problem (MDP) of epoch length 1 and state
set {0, 1}, where the goal of the agent is to reach the state 1.
Contributions. In this paper, we give a comprehensive study of best-arm identification using
quantum algorithms. Specifically, we obtain the following main result:
Theorem 1. Given a multi-armed bandit oracle O and confidence parameter δ ∈ (0, 1), there exists
a quantum algorithm that, with probability ≥ 1 − δ, outputs the best arm using O˜(√H) queries to
O. Moreover, this query complexity is optimal up to poly-logarithmic factors in n, δ, and ∆2.
This represents a quadratic quantum speedup over what is possible classically. The speedup
essentially derives from Grover’s search algorithm [26] (see Appendix A for background), where a
marker oracle is used to approximately “rotate” a uniform initial state to the marked state. One
way to understand the quadratic speedup is to observe that each rotation step, making one query
1Technically, the oracle O˜ in those references maps |i〉 |0〉 7→ |i〉 (√pi |1〉 |vi〉 + √1− pi |0〉 |ui〉) for some states
|vi〉 , |ui〉. It is not difficult to see that the algorithm we propose works unchanged in this case. Trivially, our lower
bound also applies to this model.
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to the oracle, increases the amplitude of the marked state by Ω(1/
√
n). This is possible due to the
fact that quantum computation manipulate amplitudes, which are square roots of probabilities.
However, to establish Theorem 1 we use more sophisticated machinery that extends Grover’s al-
gorithm, namely variable-time amplitude amplification (VTAA) [4, 18] and estimation (VTAE) [15].
We apply VTAA and VTAE on a variable-time quantum algorithm A that we construct. A outputs
a state with labeled “good” and “bad” parts. Using that label, VTAA removes the bad part so
that only the good part remains, and VTAE estimates the proportion of the good part. In our
application, the good part is eventually the best-arm state. If we instead used standard amplitude
amplification and estimation, which are more immediate corollaries of Grover’s algorithm, we would
get a worse complexity of O˜(
√
n/∆2).
We emphasize that our quantum algorithm, like classical ones [24, 25, 29, 31, 37], does not
require any prior knowledge about the pi. This is achieved in two stages: first, we locate p1 and p2
through binary search with a carefully chosen stopping condition; second, we use the location of p1
and p2 to rotate to the best-arm state. Note that classical algorithms do not normally need to have
two separate stages. This is because classical arm samples, stored in memory, contain information
about both the location of the best arm as well as p1 and p2. However, in the quantum setting,
we cannot simply obtain many such classical samples as this would collapse the quantum state,
preventing quantum speedup.
Related work. Classically, a naive algorithm for best-arm identification is to simply sample
each arm the same number of times and output the arm with the best empirical bias [24]. This
algorithm has complexity O( n
∆22
log(nδ )) but is sub-optimal for most multi-armed bandit instances.
Therefore, classical research on best-arm identification [24, 25, 29, 31, 37] has primarily focused
on proving bounds of the form O˜(H) (recall that H :=
∑n
i=2
1
∆2i
), which can be shown to be
almost tight for every instance. The first work to provide an algorithm with such complexity is
Ref. [24], giving O(H log(nδ ) +
∑n
i=2∆
−2
i log(∆
−1
i )). This was further improved to O
(
H log(1δ ) +∑n
i=2∆
−2
i log log(∆
−1
i )
)
by Refs. [25, 29, 31], which is almost optimal [37], except for the additive
term of
∑n
i=2∆
−2
i log log(∆
−1
i ). More recent work [16, 17] has focused on bringing down even this
additive term by tightening both the upper and lower bounds, leaving behind a gap only of the
order
∑n
i=2∆
−2
i log log(min{n,∆−1i }).
Prior work on quantum machine learning has focused primarily on supervised [33, 35, 36, 39]
and unsupervised learning [5, 32, 35, 41]. Refs. [20, 22, 30] give quantum algorithms for general
reinforcement learning with provable guarantees, but do not consider the best-arm identification
problem. The only directly comparable previous work on quantum algorithms for best-arm iden-
tification that we are aware of are [14] and [41].2 By applying Grover’s algorithm, Ref. [14] shows
that quantum computers can find the best arm with confidence p1/
∑n
i=1 pi quadratically faster
than classical ones. However, Ref. [14] does not show how to find the best arm with arbitrarily
high confidence. In fact, there is a relatively simple quantum algorithm, analogous to the naive
classical algorithm, that can achieve arbitrarily high confidence with quadratic speedup in terms of
n/∆22. This algorithm, which appears in Ref. [41, Fig. 3], works by using the quantum minimum
finding of Du¨rr and Høyer [23] on top of quantum amplitude estimation [13]. As in the classical
case, we show that this simple quantum algorithm is suboptimal for most multi-armed bandit in-
stances. Specifically, we show that a quantum algorithm can achieve quadratic speedup in terms
of the parameter H.
Open questions. This work leaves several natural open questions for future investigation:
2Ref. [41] is not framed as being about best-arm identification but is partly concerned with exactly this.
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• Can we give fast quantum algorithms for the exploitation of multi-armed bandits? In particu-
lar, can we give online algorithms with favorable regret? The quantum hedging algorithm [27]
and the quantum boosting algorithm [7] might be relevant to this challenge.
• Can we give fast quantum algorithms for other types of multi-armed bandits, such as contex-
tual bandits or adversarial bandits (e.g. [1, 9, 11])?
• Can we give fast quantum algorithms for finding a near-optimal policy of a Markov decision
process (MDP)? MDPs are a natural generalization of MABs, where the goal is to maximize
the expected reward over sequences of decisions. Ref. [24] gives a reduction from this problem
to best-arm identification by viewing the Q-function of each state as a multi-armed bandit.
2 Variable-time amplitude amplification and estimation
In this section we review variable-time amplitude amplification (VTAA) and estimation (VTAE),
which are essential components of our algorithm. VTAA and VTAE are procedures applied on top
of so-called “variable-time” quantum algorithms, which can be formally defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Variable-time quantum algorithm, cf. [4, Section 3.3] and [18, Section 5.1]). Let A
be a quantum algorithm in a space H that starts in the state |0〉H, the all-zeros state in H. We say
A is a variable-time quantum algorithm if the following conditions hold:
1. A is the product of m sub-algorithms, A = AmAm−1 · · · A1.
2. H is a tensor product H = HC⊗HA, where HC is a tensor product of m single-qubit registers
denoted HC1 ,HC2 , . . . ,HCm .
3. Each Aj is a controlled unitary that acts on the registers HCj ⊗ HA controlled on the first
j − 1 qubits of HC being set to |0〉.
4. The final state of the algorithm, A |0〉H, is perpendicular to |0〉C := |0〉C1 |0〉C2 · · · |0〉Cm .
In each iteration of the variable-time algorithm we shall construct, we use a subroutine that we
call gapped amplitude estimation (GAE). Standard amplitude estimation [13] performs phase esti-
mation on a particular unitary, and GAE is essentially the same as “gapped phase estimation” [18,
Lemma 22] of that unitary. We recall the standard technique of amplitude estimation [13]:
Theorem 2 (Amplitude estimation). Suppose Op is a unitary with Op |0〉B = |coin p〉B. Then there
is a unitary procedure AE(ǫ, δ), making O(1ǫ log
1
δ ) queries to Op and O†p, that on input |coin p〉B |0〉P
prepares a state of the form
|coin p〉B
(∑
p′
αp′ |p′〉P + α |p⊥〉P
)
, (2.1)
where |α| :=
√
1−∑p′ ∣∣αp′∣∣2 ≤ δ, 〈p′|p⊥〉 = 0 for all p′, and |p′ − p| ≤ ǫ for all p′.
Strictly speaking, the parts of Theorem 2 involving δ come from measuring the output state of
the original amplitude estimation procedure [13] O(log 1δ ) times and taking the median. This can
be made coherent by the principle of deferred measurement. Theorem 2 implies the following:
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Corollary 1 (Gapped amplitude estimation). Suppose Op is a unitary with Op |0〉 = |coin p〉. Then
there is a unitary procedure GAE(ǫ, δ; l), making O(1ǫ log
1
δ ) queries to Op and O†p, that on input
|coin p〉B |0〉C |0〉P , prepares a state of the form
|coin p〉B (β0 |0〉C |γ0〉P + β1 |1〉C |γ1〉P ), (2.2)
where β0, β1 ∈ [0, 1] satisfy β20 + β21 = 1 with β1 ≤ δ if p ≥ l − ǫ and β0 ≤ δ if p < l − 2ǫ.
Proof. We first run AE(ǫ/4, δ) on registers B,P . Then, in register C, we output 1 if the value
stored in register P is closer to l − ǫ, and output 0 if it is closer to l − 2ǫ. This gives the desired
unitary procedure. For convenience, we put any phase factors on the βi into the |γi〉.
Theorem 3 (Variable-time amplitude amplification and estimation [4, 15, 18]). Let A = Am · · · A1
be a variable-time quantum algorithm on the space H = HC ⊗HF ⊗HW . Let |0〉H be the all-zeros
state in H and let tj be the query complexity of the algorithm Aj · · · A1. We define
wj := ‖ΠCjAj · · · A1 |0〉H ‖2 and tavg :=
√∑m
j=1wjt
2
j (2.3)
to be the probability of halting at step j and the root-mean-square average query complexity of the
algorithm, respectively, where ΠCj denotes the projector onto |1〉 in HCj . We also define
psucc := ‖ΠFAm · · · A1 |0〉H ‖2 and |ψsucc〉 :=
ΠFAm · · · A1 |0〉H
‖ΠFAm · · · A1 |0〉H ‖
(2.4)
to be the success probability of the algorithm and the corresponding output state, respectively, where
ΠF projects onto |1〉 in HF . Then there exists a quantum algorithm that uses O(Q) queries to
output the state |ψsucc〉 with probability ≥ 1/2 and a bit indicating whether it succeeds, where
Q := tm log(tm) +
tavg√
psucc
log(tm). (2.5)
There also exists a quantum algorithm that uses O(Qǫ log
2(tm) log log(
tm
δ )) queries to estimate psucc
with multiplicative error ǫ with probability ≥ 1− δ.
3 Fast quantum algorithm for best-arm identification
In this section, we construct a quantum algorithm for best-arm identification and analyze its per-
formance. Specifically, we show the following:
Theorem 4. Given a multi-armed bandit oracle O and confidence parameter δ ∈ (0, 1), there exists
a quantum algorithm that outputs the best arm with probability ≥ 1− δ using O˜(√H) queries to O.
Throughout this section, we regard the oracle O as fixed, so we sometimes omit explicit reference
to it. All logs have base 2.
Our construction proceeds in three steps, which we now describe at a high level.
First, in Section 3.1, we construct a variable-time quantum algorithm denoted A (Algorithm 1)
that is initialized in a uniform superposition state |u〉 := 1√
n
∑
i∈[n] |i〉 (since initially we have no
information about which arm is the best). Given an input interval I = [l2, l1], A “flags” arm indices
in S′right := {i ∈ [n] : pi ≥ l1} with a bit f = 1 and those in S′left := {i ∈ [n] : pi ≤ l2} with a bit
f = 0. The flag bit f is written to a separate flag register F , so that the state (approximately)
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becomes 1√
n
(∑
i∈S′
right
|i〉 |1〉F +
∑
i∈S′
left
|i〉 |0〉F +
∑
i∈S′
middle
|i〉 |ψi〉F
)
for some qubit states |ψi〉,
where S′middle := [n] − (S′left ∪ S′right) = {i ∈ [n] : l2 < pi < l1}. The flag bit f stored in the F
register indicates whether VTAA (resp. VTAE), when applied on A, should (f = 1) or should not
(f = 0) amplify (resp. estimate) that part of the state.
Second, in Section 3.2, we apply VTAA and VTAE on A to construct two new algorithms
called Amplify and Estimate, respectively. Amplify produces a uniform superposition of all those
is with F register in |1〉, while Estimate counts the number of such is. More precisely, Estimate
(approximately) counts the number of indices in S′right, as their F register is in |1〉, plus some
(unknown) fraction of indices in S′middle as dictated by the fraction of |1〉 in the (unknown) states
|ψi〉.
Third, in Section 3.3, we use Estimate as a subroutine in Locate (Algorithm 2) to find l2, l1
such that p2 < l2 < l2 + ∆2/4 ≤ l1 < p1. Then, running Amplify with these l2, l1 in BestArm
(Algorithm 4) gives the state |1〉 containing the best-arm index because only p1 is to the right of
l2. Locate is a type of binary search that counts the number of indices in S
′
right using Estimate.
There is a technical difficulty here because Estimate actually counts the number of indices in S′right
plus some fraction of indices in S′middle. Trying to fix this by simply setting l2 = l1, so that
S′middle = ∅, does not work as it would increase the cost of Estimate. We overcome this difficulty
via the Shrink subroutine (Algorithm 3) of Locate, which employs a technique from recent work on
quantum ground state preparation [34].
3.1 Variable-time quantum algorithm
We first construct a variable-time quantum algorithm (Algorithm 1) that we call A throughout. A
uses the following registers: input register I; bandit register B; clock register C = (C1, . . . , Cm+1),
where each Ci is a qubit; ancillary amplitude estimation register P = (P1, . . . , Pm), where each Pi
has O(m) qubits; and flag register F . We set m := ⌈log(1/(l1− l2))⌉+2 as assigned in Algorithm 1.
A is indeed a variable-time quantum algorithm according to Definition 1. This is because we can
write A = Am+1Am · · · A1A0 as a product of m+ 2 sub-algorithms, where A0 is the initialization
step (Line 4), Aj consists of the operations in iteration j of the for loop (Lines 6–9) for j ∈ [m],
and Am+1 is the termination step (Lines 10–11). The state spaces HC and HA in Definition 1
correspond to the state spaces of the C register and the remaining registers of A, respectively.
Am+1 ensures that Condition 4 of Definition 1 is satisfied.
We define the following three sets that partition [n]:
Sleft := {i ∈ [n] : pi < l1 −∆/2}, (3.1)
Smiddle := {i ∈ [n] : l1 −∆/2 ≤ pi < l1 −∆/8}, (3.2)
Sright := {i ∈ [n] : pi ≥ l1 −∆/8}. (3.3)
Note that these sets play the roles of S′left, S
′
middle, and S
′
right mentioned at the start of Section 3.
They can be regarded as functions of (the input to) A. In the following, to quantify the proximity
of quantum states, we say that |ψ〉 and |φ〉 are ǫ-close if ‖ |ψ〉 − |φ〉 ‖ ≤ ǫ.
6
Algorithm 1: A(O, l2, l1, α)
Input: Oracle O as in (1.2); 0 < l2 < l1 < 1; approximation parameter 0 < α < 1.
1 ∆← l1 − l2
2 m← ⌈log 1∆⌉+ 2
3 a← α
2mn3/2
4 Initialize state to 1√
n
∑n
i=1 |i〉I |coin pi〉B |0〉C |0〉P |1〉F
5 for j = 1, . . . ,m do
6 ǫj ← 2−j
7 if register I is in state |i〉 and registers C1, . . . , Cj−1 are in state |0〉 then
8 Apply GAE(ǫj , a; l1) with Opi on registers B, Cj, and Pj
9 Apply controlled-NOT gate with control on register Cj and target on register F
10 if registers C1, . . . , Cm are in state |0〉 then
11 Flip the bit stored in register Cm+1
Lemma 1 (Correctness of A). The output state |φ(A)〉 of A is (α/n)-close to
|ψ(A)〉 := 1√
n
∑
Sright
|i〉I |coin pi〉B |ψi〉C,P |1〉F
+
1√
n
∑
Sleft
|i〉I |coin pi〉B |ψi〉C,P |0〉F
+
1√
n
∑
Smiddle
|i〉I |coin pi〉B (βi,1 |ψi,1〉C,P |1〉F + βi,0 |ψi,0〉C,P |0〉F )
for some βi,1, βi,0 ∈ C and states |ψi〉 , |ψi,j〉. In particular, we have |psucc − p′succ| ≤ 2αn where
psucc := ‖ΠF |φ(A)〉 ‖2 and p′succ := ‖ΠF |ψ(A)〉 ‖2 = 1n
(|Sright|+∑i∈Smiddle |βi,1|2).
At a high level, at iteration j, Line 8 approximately identifies those i ∈ Sleft with pi ∈
[l1 − 2ǫj , l1 − ǫj) and stops computation on these is by setting their associated C registers to
|1〉. Line 9 then flags these is by setting their associated F registers to |0〉, indicating failure.
We give the detailed proof in Appendix B, which is mainly concerned with bounding the error
in the aforementioned approximation. We also defer the proof of the following lemma about the
complexity of A to Appendix B.
Lemma 2 (Complexity of A). A(O, l2, l1, α) has the following complexities:
1. The jth stopping time tj of AjAj−1 · · · A0 is of order
∑j
k=1
1
ǫk
log 1a ≤ 2j+1 log 1a . In particular,
tm+1 = O(
1
∆ log
1
a).
2. The average stopping time squared, t2avg, is of order
1
n
( |Sright|
∆2
+
∑
i∈Sleft∪Smiddle
1
(l1 − pi)2
)
log2
(1
a
)
. (3.4)
3.2 Applying VTAA and VTAE to A
In this subsection, we fix algorithm A and its input parameters. We always assume that |Sright| > 0,
so |Sright| ≥ 1, which we need for some of the following results to hold. This is without loss of
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generality as we can always add an artificial arm 0 to O with bias p0 = 1, as we do in Line 3 of
Algorithm 3.
We apply3 VTAA and VTAE (Theorem 3) on our variable-time quantum algorithm A to prepare
the state |ψsucc〉 and estimate the probability psucc, respectively. This gives two new algorithms
Amplify and Estimate with the following performance guarantees.
Lemma 3 (Correctness and complexity of Amplify(A, δ), Estimate(A, ǫ, δ)). Let A = A(O, l2, l1, 0.01δ).
Then Amplify(A, δ) uses O(Q) queries to output an index i ∈ Sright∪Smiddle with probability ≥ 1−δ,
and Estimate(A, ǫ, δ) uses O(Q/ǫ) queries to output an estimate r of p′succ (defined in Lemma 1)
such that
(1− ǫ)
(
p′succ −
0.1
n
)
< r < (1 + ǫ)
(
p′succ +
0.1
n
)
(3.5)
with probability ≥ 1− δ, where
Q =
(
1
∆2
+
1
|Sright|
∑
Sleft∪Smiddle
1
(l1 − pi)2
)
poly
(
log
( n
δ∆
))
. (3.6)
Proof sketch. Apply Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 to Theorem 3. See Appendix B for details.
3.3 Quantum algorithm for best-arm identification
In this subsection, we use Amplify and Estimate to construct three algorithms (Algorithms 2–4)
that work together to identify the best arm following the outline at the start of Section 3.
Algorithm 2: Locate(O, δ)
Input: Oracle O as in (1.2); confidence parameter 0 < δ < 1.
1 I1, I2 ← [0, 1]
2 δ ← δ/8
3 while min I1 −max I2 < 2 |I1| do
4 I1 ← Shrink(O, 1, I1, δ)
5 I2 ← Shrink(O, 2, I2, δ)
6 δ ← δ/2
7 return I1, I2
Lemma 4 (Correctness and complexity of Algorithm 2). Fix a confidence parameter 0 < δ < 1.
Then the event E = {p1 ∈ I1 and p2 ∈ I2 in all iterations of the while loop} holds with probability
≥ 1− δ. When E holds, Algorithm 2 also satisfies the following for both k ∈ {1, 2}:
1. its while loop (Line 3) breaks at or before the end of iteration ⌈log5/3( 1∆2 )⌉ + 3 and then
returns Ik with pk ∈ Ik and min I1 − max I2 ≥ 2 |I1|; during the while loop, we always have
|I1| = |I2| ≥ ∆2/8; and
2. it uses O
(√
H poly
(
log
(
n
δ∆2
)))
queries.
Lemma 5 (Correctness and complexity of Algorithm 3). Fix k ∈ {1, 2}, an interval I = [a, b], and
a confidence parameter 0 < δ < 1. Suppose that pk ∈ I and |I| ≥ ∆2/8. Then Algorithm 3
1. outputs an interval J with |J | = 35 |I| such that pk ∈ J with probability ≥ 1− δ, and
3The state spaces HC , HF , and HW in Theorem 3 correspond to the state spaces of the C, F , and remaining
registers of A, respectively.
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Algorithm 3: Shrink(O, k, I, δ)
Input: Oracle O as in (1.2); k ∈ {1, 2}; interval I = [a, b]; confidence parameter 0 < δ < 1.
1 ǫ← (b− a)/5
2 δ ← δ/2
3 Append arm i = 0 with bias p0 = 1 to O; call the resulting oracle O′
4 Construct variable-time quantum algorithms A1,A2:
5 A1 ← A(O′, l2 = a+ ǫ, l1 = a+ 3ǫ, 0.01δ)
6 A2 ← A(O′, l2 = a+ 2ǫ, l1 = a+ 4ǫ, 0.01δ)
7 r1 ← Estimate(A1, ǫ = 0.1, δ)
8 r2 ← Estimate(A2, ǫ = 0.1, δ)
9 B1 ← 1(r1 > k+0.5n+1 ); B2 ← 1(r2 > k+0.5n+1 )
10 switch (B1, B2) do
11 case (0, 0) : I ← [a, a+ 3ǫ]
12 case (0, 1) : I ← [a+ ǫ, a+ 4ǫ]
13 case (1, 0) : I ← [a+ ǫ, a+ 4ǫ]
14 case (1, 1) : I ← [a+ 2ǫ, a+ 5ǫ = b]
15 return I
Algorithm 4: BestArm(O, δ)
Input: Oracle O as in (1.2); confidence parameter 0 < δ < 1.
1 δ ← δ/2
2 I1, I2 ← Locate(O, δ)
3 l1 ← min I1 (left endpoint of I1)
4 l2 ← max I2 (right endpoint of I2)
5 Construct variable-time quantum algorithm A:
6 A ← A(O, l2, l1, 0.01δ)
7 i← Amplify(A, δ)
8 return i
2. uses O
(√
H poly
(
log
(
n
δ∆2
)))
queries.
The proofs of Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 appear in Appendix B.
The following theorem is equivalent to Theorem 4.
Theorem 5 (Correctness and complexity of Algorithm 4). Fix a confidence parameter 0 < δ < 1.
Then, with probability ≥ 1− δ, Algorithm 4
1. outputs the best arm, and
2. uses O
(√
H poly
(
log
(
n
δ∆2
)))
queries.
Proof. Note that δ is halved at the beginning, on Line 1. For the first claim, we know from the first
claim of Lemma 4 that, with probability ≥ 1 − δ/2, the two intervals Ik assigned in Line 2 have
min I1 −max I2 ≥ 2 |I1| ≥ ∆2/4 and pk ∈ Ik. Assuming this holds, we have p2 < l2 < l2 +∆2/4 ≤
l1 < p1 for the endpoints lk assigned in Lines 3 and 4. This means that the variable-time quantum
algorithm A defined in Line 6 has Sright ∪ Smiddle = {1}, so Amplify(A, δ/2) returns index 1 with
probability ≥ 1 − δ/2. Therefore, the overall probability of Algorithm 4 returning the best arm is
at least 1− δ.
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The second claim follows immediately from adding the complexity of Locate(O, δ/2) (Lemma 4)
and Amplify(A, δ/2) (Lemma 3, using l1 − l2 ≥ ∆2/4).
By establishing Theorem 5, we have established Theorem 4, the main claim of Section 3. As
discussed previously, the main complexity measure of interest in the classical case is H, and we see
that we get a quadratic speedup in terms of this parameter.
We can see that the poly-logarithmic factor has degree about 6 from (B.16), (B.18), and (B.20).
It would be interesting to reduce this degree. A more fundamental challenge is to remove the
variable n that appears in our log factors. In the classical case, n was already removed from log
factors in early work [24] by a procedure called “median elimination”. However, quantizing the
median elimination framework is nontrivial, as the query complexity for outputting the n/2 smallest
items among n elements is Θ(n) [3, Theorem 1], exceeding our budget of O(
√
n).
As corollaries of our main results in the fixed confidence setting, we provide results on best-
arm identification in the PAC (Probably Approximately Correct) and fixed-budget settings. In the
(ǫ, δ)-PAC setting, the goal is to identify an arm i with pi ≥ p1 − ǫ with probability ≥ 1 − δ. We
provide an algorithm with query complexity O
(√
min{ nǫ2 ,H} poly(log( nδ∆2 ))
)
. In the fixed-budget
setting, the goal is to identify the best arm with high probability for a fixed number T of total
queries (the budget). As a direct corollary of Theorem 4, when H is known in advance, there is an
algorithm that returns the best arm with probability ≥ 1− exp(−Ω(T/√H)) by using a reduction
similar to that from Monte Carlo to Las Vegas algorithms. See Appendix C for details.
4 Quantum lower bounds
We also establish a lower bound for the quantum best-arm identification problem. Our lower bound
shows that the algorithm of Theorem 4 is optimal up to poly-logarithmic factors.
Theorem 6. Let p ∈ (0, 1/2). For arbitrary biases pi ∈ [p, 1 − p], any quantum algorithm that
identifies the best arm requires Ω(
√
H) queries to the multi-armed bandit oracle O.
To prove this lower bound, we use the quantum adversary method to show quantum hardness of
distinguishing oracles corresponding to the following n bandits. In the 1st bandit, we assign bias pi
to arm i for all i. In the xth bandit for x ∈ {2, . . . , n}, we assign bias p1+ η to arm x and pi to arm
i for all i 6= x, where η is an appropriately chosen parameter. This hard set of bandits is inspired
by the proof of a corresponding classical lower bound [37, Theorem 5]. We defer the full proof to
Appendix D. For convenience, we also introduce the quantum adversary method in Appendix A.2.
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A Quantum computing background
A.1 Definitions and notation
Quantum computing is naturally formulated in terms of linear algebra. In the space Cn, we call
{~e1, . . . , ~en} its computational basis, where ~ei = (0, . . . , 1, . . . , 0)⊤ and the 1 only appears in the
ith coordinate. These basis vectors can be written in Dirac notation: |i〉 := ~ei (called a “ket”),
and 〈i| := ~e⊤i (called a “bra”). An n-dimensional quantum state is a unit vector in Cn, i.e.,
|x〉 = (x1, . . . , xn)⊤ such that
∑n
i=1 |xi|2 = 1. The tensor product of quantum states is their
Kronecker product: if |x〉 ∈ Cn1 and |y〉 ∈ Cn2 , then
|x〉 |y〉 := |x〉 ⊗ |y〉 := (x1y1, x1y2, . . . , xn1yn2)⊤ ∈ Cn1 ⊗ Cn2 . (A.1)
Every step of a quantum algorithm is unitary, i.e., a linear transformation U such that U † = U−1.
Recall that for multi-armed bandits, the quantum oracle we adopt in (1.2) is
O : |i〉I |0〉B 7→ |i〉I |coin pi〉B ∀ i ∈ [n], where |coin p〉 :=
√
p |1〉 +
√
1− p |0〉 . (A.2)
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Specifically, we can access the arms in superposition by querying the unitary oracle O with a state
|x〉 in the register I, which gives the output quantum state
O |x〉 =
n∑
i=1
xi |i〉I
(√
pi |1〉B +
√
1− pi |0〉B
)
. (A.3)
Directly measuring this state corresponds to pulling an arm classically following the probability
distribution |xi|2. But quantumly, as we show in Section 3, there are more advanced quantum
algorithms that achieve quadratic speedup in terms of H.
Our quantum speedup originates from Grover’s search algorithm [26]. Consider a function
fw : [n]→ {−1, 1} such that fw(i) = 1 if and only if i 6= w, so that w can be viewed as a (unique)
marked item. To search for w, classically we need Ω(n) queries to fw. Quantumly, given a unitary
Uw such that Uw |i〉 = |i〉 for all i 6= w and Uw |w〉 = − |w〉, Grover considered the uniform
superposition |u〉 := 1√
n
∑
i∈[n] |i〉 as well as the state |r〉 := 1√n−1
∑
i∈[n]/{w} |i〉. The angle between
Uw |u〉 and |u〉 is θ := arccos(1/n) = Θ(1/
√
n). Note that the unitary Uw reflects about |r〉, and
the unitary Uu = 2 |u〉 〈u| − I reflects about |u〉. If we start with |u〉, the angle between Uw |u〉 and
UuUw |u〉 is amplified to 2θ, and in general the angle between Uw |u〉 and (UuUw)k |u〉 is 2kθ. It
thus suffices to take k = Θ(
√
n) to find w.
This method of alternatively applying two reflections to boost the amplitude for success can be
generalized to a technique called amplitude amplification. For the case with some unknown number
k ∈ [n] of marked items, there is also a quadratic quantum speedup for estimating θ := arccos(k/n)
via a technique called amplitude estimation [13]. Amplitude amplification and estimation are the
main building blocks of VTAA and VTAE, which are presented in Section 2.
In the context of searching, consider a quantum procedureA that returns a state |ψ〉 with t oracle
queries, such that the overlap between the target state |w〉 and output state |ψ〉 is psucc := |〈w|ψ〉|2.
By amplitude amplification and estimation [13], O(t/
√
psucc) oracle queries suffice to either amplify
the overlap to constant order (AA) or to estimate psucc (AE). The purpose of VTAA and VTAE is to
reduce the number of oracle queries when the intermediate states of the algorithm have considerable
overlap with the target state |w〉. See [4, 15, 18] for details.
In this paper, we mainly focus on quantum query complexity, which is defined as the total number
of oracle queries. If we have an efficient quantum algorithm for an explicit computational problem
in the query complexity setting, then if we are given an explicit circuit realizing the black-box
transformation, we will have an efficient quantum algorithm for the problem.
We conclude with a few references for further background. The book by Nielsen and Chuang [38]
is a standard textbook on quantum computing, with a very detailed introduction to basic definitions
(Section 3), Grover’s algorithm and amplitude amplification (Section 6), and other related topics.
Amplitude estimation is also known as quantum counting and is a standard technique in quantum
algorithms [13, Section 4].
A.2 Quantum lower bounds by the adversary method
Suppose we have n multi-armed bandit oracles Ox, x ∈ [n], corresponding to n multi-armed bandits
where the best arm is located at a different index in each. Suppose that we also have a best-arm
identification algorithm A that uses no more than T queries to identify the best arm with probability
≥ 1− δ.
The basic quantum adversary method [2, 28] considers a quantity of the form
sk :=
∑
x 6=y
wx,y 〈ψ(k)x |ψ(k)y 〉 , (A.4)
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where k ∈ [T ], x, y ∈ [n], wx,y ≥ 0, and |ψ(k)x 〉 is the state of A after the kth query to the oracle Ox.
At step k = 0, A has made no queries to the oracle, so |ψ(0)x 〉 must be the same for all x.
Therefore s0 =
∑
x 6=y wx,y as 〈ψ(0)x |ψ(0)y 〉 = 1.
At step k = T , A must output the index of the best arm with probability ≥ 1 − δ. Since the
location of the best arm is different for each Ox, the states |ψ(T )x 〉 must be distinguishable by a
quantum measurement with probability ≥ 1 − δ. This means that | 〈ψ(T )x |ψ(T )y 〉 | ≤ 2
√
δ(1 − δ).
Therefore |sT | ≤ 2
√
δ(1 − δ) ·∑x 6=y wx,y.
Combining the above observations, we have
|s0 − sT | ≥ |s0| − |sT | ≥ (1− 2
√
δ(1 − δ)) ·
∑
x 6=y
wx,y. (A.5)
Hence, if we can upper bound |sk+1 − sk| by B for some constant B, we can deduce that
T ≥ 1− 2
√
δ(1− δ)
B
·
∑
x 6=y
wx,y, (A.6)
giving a lower bound on the query complexity.
Note that we apply the quantum adversary method to multi-armed bandit oracles of the form
given in (1.2), whereas most results from the literature on quantum lower bounds assume a different
form of oracle. We remark that Ref. [10] treats a more general class of oracles, so it should be
possible to prove Theorem 6 using its results. However, we give a self-contained proof using the
formulation described above as this approach is straightforward in our case.
B Proof details of the quantum upper bound
B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
As our proof is similar to that presented in Ref. [18, Section 5.3], we only sketch it in a way that
highlights the differences. For comparison, it may be helpful to note that our states |i〉I |coin pi〉
are analogous to the matrix eigenstates |λ〉 in Ref. [18]. The controlled-NOT operation in Line 9 of
our Algorithm 1 takes the place of the simulation subroutine called “W” in Ref. [18, Lemma 23],
which is much more elaborate.
We proceed with the proof sketch. Let Amain := Am+1 · · · A1 denote the part of A after
initialization. We show that, for each fixed i, Amain |i〉I |coin pi〉B |0〉C,P,F is ( αn3/2 )-close to
Case i ∈ Smiddle: |i〉I |coin pi〉B (βi,1 |ψi〉C,P |1〉F + βi,0 |ψi,0〉C,P |0〉F ) for some βi,1, βi,0 ∈ C and
states |ψi〉 , |ψi,j〉;
Case i ∈ Sright: |i〉I |coin pi〉B |ψi〉C,P |1〉F ;
Case i ∈ Sleft: |i〉I |coin pi〉B |ψi〉C,P |0〉F .
Then |φ(A)〉 = A |0〉I,B,C,P,F = Amain 1√n
∑n
i=1 |i〉I |coin pi〉B |0〉C,P,F is ( 1√n · n · αn3/2 = αn )-close
to |ψ(A)〉 as claimed.
Case i ∈ Smiddle. This is trivially true because βi,1 |ψi,1〉C,P |1〉F +βi,0 |ψi,0〉C,P |0〉F can represent
any state on registers C,P, F .
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Case i ∈ Sleft. Let j ∈ [m−1] be such that l1−2ǫj ≤ pi < l1−ǫj. Note that this j uniquely exists
by the definition of Sleft, m, and ǫj . Then the state of the algorithm after the (j − 1)st iteration of
the for-loop in Line 5 is (2(j − 1)a)-close to
|i〉I |coin pi〉B |0〉C |γ10〉P1 · · · |γ
j−1
0 〉Pj−1 |0〉Pj ···Pm |1〉F , (B.1)
where, for each i, the state |0〉Ci |γ0〉Pi corresponds to the state |0〉C |γ0〉 in GAE(ǫj , a; l1). Note
that we incur an error of at most 2a at each iteration which comes from running GAE(ǫj , a; l1) (cf.
the case where β1 ≤ a in Corollary 1). This error accumulates additively.
The state after the jth iteration is (2ja)-close to
β0 |i〉I |coin pi〉B |0〉C |γ10〉P1 · · · |γ
j
0〉Pj |0〉Pj+1···Pm |1〉F
+ β1 |i〉I |coin pi〉B |j〉C |γ10〉P1 · · · |γ
j
0〉Pj |0〉Pj+1···Pm |1〉F ,
(B.2)
where j := 0j−110m−j denotes a unary representation of the integer j.
At the (j + 1)st iteration, the part of the state in the second line of Eq. (B.2) is unchanged
because its register C indicates “stop”, but the part in the first line of Eq. (B.2) changes to being
(2(j + 1)a)-close to
β0 |i〉I |coin pi〉B |j + 1〉C |γ10〉P1 · · · |γ
j
0〉Pj |γ
j+1
0 〉Pj+1 |0〉Pj+2···Pm |0〉F . (B.3)
Hence, the state after the (j + 1)st iteration is (2(j + 1)a)-close to
β0 |i〉I |coin pi〉B |j + 1〉C |γ10〉P1 · · · |γ
j
0〉Pj |γ
j+1
0 〉Pj+1 |0〉Pj+2···Pm |0〉F
+ β1 |i〉I |coin pi〉B |j〉C |γ10〉P1 · · · |γ
j
0〉Pj |0〉Pj+1···Pm |0〉F .
(B.4)
Since the C register of all parts of the state in Eq. (B.4) indicates “stop”, the remaining iterations
j+2, . . . ,m of A do not alter it. Hence the final state of A is (2ma)-close to the state in Eq. (B.4),
which is of the form
|i〉I |coin pi〉B |ψi〉C,P |0〉F . (B.5)
Note that 2ma = α
n3/2
, so the closeness of approximation is as claimed.
Case i ∈ Sright. In this case, there does not exist a j ∈ [m− 1] such that l1 − 2ǫj ≤ pi < l1 − ǫj .
Thus a simplified version of the argument above, in which we do not have to consider different
cases according to the iteration number, shows that the resulting state is (2ma)-close to a state of
the same form as Eq. (B.5) but with the F register remaining in state 1.
Lastly, we show that psucc is close to p
′
succ as claimed:∣∣psucc − p′succ∣∣ = ∣∣∣(√psucc +√p′succ) · (√psucc −√p′succ)∣∣∣
=
(√
psucc +
√
p′succ
) · ∣∣‖ΠF |φ(A)〉 ‖ − ‖ΠF |ψ(A)〉 ‖∣∣
≤ 2 ‖ΠF (|φ(A)〉 − |ψ(A)〉)‖
≤ 2 α
n
.
(B.6)
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B.2 Proof of Lemma 2
The proof is similar to that presented in Ref. [18, Section 5.4]. For the first claim, note first that
A0 and Am+1 use a constant number of queries (1 and 0, respectively), so we can ignore them. For
k ∈ [m], Ak only uses queries to perform GAE(ǫk, d; l1), which takes O( 1ǫk log
1
a) queries. Therefore
tj, the number of queries in AjAj−1 · · · A1, is of order
j∑
k=1
1
ǫk
log
(1
a
)
=
j∑
k=1
2k log
(1
a
)
≤ 2j+1 log
(1
a
)
(B.7)
because ǫk = 2
−k by definition. In addition, we have tm = O( 1∆ log
1
a) because m = ⌈log 1∆⌉+ 2 by
definition. The first claim follows.
For the second claim, we have
t2avg =
m∑
j=1
wjt
2
j =
m∑
j=1
∥∥∥∥ΠCjAj · · · A1 1√n
n∑
i=1
|i〉I |coin pi〉B |0〉C |0〉P |1〉F
∥∥∥∥
2
t2j (B.8)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
wi,jt
2
j (B.9)
=
1
n
n∑
i=1
τ2i , (B.10)
where wi,j := ‖ΠCjAj · · · A1 |i〉I |coin pi〉B |0〉C |0〉P |1〉F ‖2 ∈ [0, 1] and τi :=
∑m
j=1wi,jt
2
j .
Note that wi,j can be thought of as the probability that A stops at the end of iteration j if
initialized with arm i; τ2i can be thought of as the squared average stopping time of A if initialized
with arm i.
For each fixed i, we consider τ2i according to the following three cases.
Case i ∈ Sright. We have
∑m
j=1wi,j = 1, so τ
2
i ≤ t2m = O(22m log2( 1a)) = O( 1∆2 log2( 1a)) because
m = ⌈log 1∆⌉+ 2 by definition.
Case i ∈ Smiddle. We still have τ2i = O( 1∆2 log2( 1a)) as in the case i ∈ Sright, by exactly the
same argument. But by the definition of Smiddle, we have l1 − pi ≤ ∆/2, so we can also write
τ2i = O
(
1
(l1−pi)2 log
2( 1a)
)
.
Case i ∈ Sleft. For i ∈ Sleft, let j ∈ [m− 1] be such that l1 − 2ǫj ≤ pi < l1 − ǫj as in the proof of
Lemma 1.
We know that after the (j+1)st iteration, the state is (ma = α/n)-close to the state in (B.4) on
which the algorithm terminates. Therefore, the probability wi,j+1 of terminating after the (j+1)
st
iteration is 1− O((α/n)2). It can also be seen that the probability wi,j+r of terminating after the
(j + r)th iteration is (1−O((α/n)2)) · O((α/n)2(r−1)). Hence
τ2i ≤ t2j+1 +O
(m−j∑
r=2
(α
n
)2(r−1)
t2j+r
)
= O(t2j+1) = O
(
log2( 1a)
ǫj+1
)
= O
(
log2( 1a)
(l1 − pi)2
)
, (B.11)
where we used ǫj+1 = ǫj/2 ≥ (l1 − pi)/4 for the last inequality.
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Substituting the above results into (B.10) tells us that t2avg is of order
1
n
( |Sright|
∆2
+
∑
i∈Sleft∪Smiddle
1
(l1 − pi)2
)
· log2
(1
a
)
(B.12)
as desired.
B.3 Proof of Lemma 3
We set the approximation parameter in A to be α = cδ for some constant c < 0.05 to be determined
later. Then α < 0.05.
We apply VTAA (Theorem 3) on A. This gives an algorithm that outputs a state |ψsucc〉 that
is (αn =
cδ
n )-close to the (normalized) state proportional to
ΠF |ψ(A)〉 = 1√
n
( ∑
i∈Sright
|i〉I |coin pi〉B |ψi〉C,P |1〉F +
∑
i∈Smiddle
αi,1 |i〉I |coin pi〉B |ψi,1〉C,P |1〉F
)
(B.13)
with success probability at least 1/2 and a bit indicating success or failure. Now, we repeat the
entire procedure O(log 1δ ) times to prepare |ψsucc〉 at least once with probability ≥ 1 − δ/2. Once
|ψsucc〉 has been successfully prepared, as indicated by the algorithm, we measure its index register
I. This procedure outputs an arm index in Sright∪Smiddle with probability ≥ (1− δ/2) · (1−2cδ/n)
which is ≥ 1 − δ for c ≤ 1/4 sufficiently small. So, as we also need c < 0.05, we choose c = 0.01.
We call this procedure Amplify(A, δ).
Let us consider the query complexity of Amplify(A, δ). We have
tm+1 = O
( 1
∆
log
(1
a
))
= O
( 1
∆
log
(
n log
( 1
∆
)))
(B.14)
because a = α
2(⌈log(1/∆)⌉+2)n3/2 by definition. We also have
psucc ≥ p′succ −
2α
n
≥ |Sright|
n
− 0.1
n
>
|Sright|
2n
, (B.15)
where we used the assumption |Sright| > 0 for the last inequality. Lastly, t2avg is of order given in (3.4)
(reproduced in (B.12) above). Therefore, substituting all these bounds into (2.5) of Theorem 3, we
see that Amplify(A, δ) has query complexity of order(
1
∆2
+
1
|Sright|
∑
Sleft∪Smiddle
1
(l1 − pi)2
)
· log
(n
δ
log
1
∆
)
· log
( 1
∆
log
(n
δ
log
( 1
∆
)))
· log
(1
δ
)
. (B.16)
We also apply VTAE (Theorem 3) with multiplicative accuracy ǫ and confidence δ on A. This
gives an algorithm, Estimate(A, ǫ, δ), that outputs an estimate r of psucc with multiplicative ac-
curacy ǫ (i.e., |r − psucc| < ǫpsucc) with probability ≥ 1 − δ. Combining |r − psucc| < ǫpsucc with
|psucc − p′succ| ≤ 2αn < 0.1n gives
(1− ǫ)
(
p′succ −
0.1
n
)
< r < (1 + ǫ)
(
p′succ +
0.1
n
)
(B.17)
as claimed.
The query complexity of Estimate(A, ǫ, δ) is
(B.16) · 1
ǫ
log2(tm+1) log
(
log
(tm+1
δ
))
= (B.16) ·O
(1
ǫ
poly
(
log
( n
δ∆
)))
(B.18)
according to Theorem 3 and (B.14).
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B.4 Proof of Lemma 4
From the first claim of Lemma 5, we see that the probability of Ec is at most δ4
∑∞
i=0 2
−i = δ/2,
where the geometric series arises because of Line 6. Henceforth, we assume E.
Consider the first claim. For given intervals I2, I1, let us write
gap(I2, I1) := min I1 −max I2. (B.19)
At the end of iteration i ≥ 1 (i.e., after Line 6), we have |Ik| = (3/5)i by the first claim of Lemma 5.
At the end of iteration ⌈log5/3( 1∆2 )⌉+3, we have |Ik| < ∆2/4, so gap(I2, I1) > ∆2−2∆2/4 = ∆2/2 >
2 |I1| because pk ∈ Ik. Therefore the while loop must break at this point if it has not done so earlier.
For the returned Ik, we clearly have pk ∈ Ik because E holds, and gap(I2, I1) > 2 |I1| because the
while loop has broken. During the while loop, because |Ik| decreases from iteration to iteration,
we always have |Ik| ≥ (3/5)⌈log5/3(∆
−1
2 )⌉+3 ≥ ∆2/8. Note that |I1| = |I2| because, at each iteration
of the while loop, the Shrink subroutine always shrinks intervals by the same factor of 3/5 and
|I1| = |I2| = 1 initially.
Now, consider the second claim. From the first claim, we know that the while loop breaks at
or before the end of iteration ⌈log5/3(∆−12 ))⌉ + 3, and we always have 1/δi = O(2log5/3(∆
−1
2 )/δ) =
O(∆−22 /δ), where δi = δ/2
2+i is the confidence parameter in Shrink at iteration i. Therefore, using
the second claim of Lemma 5, the total number of queries used is at most
O(log(∆−12 )) ·O
(√
H · poly
(
log
( n
∆2
· ∆
−2
2
δ
)))
, (B.20)
which is O
(√
H · poly(log( nδ∆2 ))
)
as desired.
B.5 Proof of Lemma 5
Throughout, we fix k ∈ {0, 1}.
For the first claim, it is clear that |J | = 3 |I| /5 because all the intervals appearing in Lines 11–14
have length 3ǫ. Our proof that pk ∈ J with high probability is similar to that in Ref. [34, Section 4]
so we only present a brief sketch below.
Let us write xj = a+ jǫ for j = 0, . . . , 5, so that x0 = a and x5 = b. Let E be the event that
both Estimates in Lines 7 and 8 return the correct result. The probability of Ec is at most δ so we
restrict to the case of E in the following paragraph.
For j ∈ {1, 2}, we can use (3.5) in Lemma 3 to see that if pk ≤ xj , then Bj = 0 because
rj ≤ (1+ 0.1)( kn+1 + 0.1n+1) < k+0.5n+1 , whereas if pk ≥ xj+2, then Bj = 1 because rj ≥ (1− 0.1)( k+1n+1 −
0.1
n+1) >
k+0.5
n+1 . Here we use the fact k ∈ {1, 2}. By considering the contrapositive of the previous
two if-then statements, we establish the first claim.
For more details, we refer the reader to Ref. [34, Section 4], in particular its Table 2 and
Algorithm 1. Note that in the case of (B1, B2) = (0, 1), we could have shrunk the interval to
[a+ 2ǫ, a+ 3ǫ] and still maintained pk ∈ J , as is done in Ref. [34]. However, it is important for us
to keep the shrinkage factor (3/5) the same in all cases because we use this to prove correctness in
Lemma 4.
We now prove the second claim. Since we run Estimate with constant multiplicative error
ǫ = 0.1, its query complexity is of order (B.16), which is
1
∆2
+
1
|Sright|
∑
i∈Sleft∪Smiddle
1
(l1 − pi)2 (B.21)
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up to polylog factors, where we recall that ∆ = l1 − l2. In addition, we recall
Sleft ∪ Smiddle = {i : pi < l1 −∆/8} (B.22)
from (3.2) and (3.3). Note that |Sright| > 0 because we appended an arm with bias p0 = 1.
By assumption, |I| ≥ ∆2/8. So, in view of Lines 5 and 6, we have ∆ = 2ǫ = 2 |I| /5 ≥ ∆2/20.
Therefore 1/∆2 = O(1/∆22).
We also need to compare p1 − pi with l1 − pi for i ∈ Sleft ∪ Smiddle. By definition, we have
pi < l1 − ∆/8, so l1 − pi > ∆/8. Note that we also have |pk − l1| ≤ |I| = 5∆/2 because pk ∈ I
by assumption and l1 ∈ I by definition. If k = 1, this says |p1 − l1| ≤ 5∆/2. If k = 2, this says
|p2 − l1| ≤ 5∆/2, but we can still bound
|p1 − l1| ≤ ∆2 + |p2 − l1| ≤ 20∆ + 5∆/2 < 25∆. (B.23)
So regardless of whether k = 1 or k = 2, we have that |p1 − l1| < 25∆. Therefore
p1 − pi
l1 − pi = 1 +
p1 − l1
l1 − pi < 1 +
25∆
∆/8
= 201, (B.24)
and so 1/(l1 − pi)2 = O(1/(p1 − pi)2). Hence we have established the second claim.
C Corollaries for the PAC and fixed-budget settings
C.1 PAC setting
Another setting often considered in the classical literature is the (ǫ, δ)-PAC setting. The goal
here is to identify an arm i with pi ≥ p1 − ǫ with probability ≥ 1 − δ. Our best-arm identifi-
cation algorithm can be modified to work in this setting as well. More precisely, we can modify
Locate (Algorithm 2) by adding a breaking condition to the while loop when |I1| (or equivalently
|I2|) is smaller than ǫ. The resulting algorithm finds an ǫ-optimal arm with query complexity
O
(√
min{ n
ǫ2
,H} · poly(log( nδ∆2 ))). Note that our modification means that the Amplify step in
Algorithm 4 takes an input interval I with |I| = l1−l2 ∈ [ǫ/2, ǫ]. The correctness and complexity fol-
low directly from Lemma 1 and Lemma 3. For comparison, Ref. [24] gave a classical PAC algorithm
with complexity O
(
n
ǫ2
log
(
n
δ
))
, which was later improved to O
(∑n
i=1min{ǫ−2,∆−2i } · log
(
n
δ∆2
))
by
Ref. [25].
C.2 Fixed-budget setting
As mentioned near the end of Section 3, by using a reduction similar to that from Monte Carlo
to Las Vegas algorithms, we can construct a fixed-budget algorithm from our fixed-confidence one.
For completeness, we state and prove the following result:
Lemma 6 (Reduction to fixed confidence). Let O be a multi-armed bandit oracle. Suppose that for
any δ ∈ (0, 1), we have an algorithm Ac(δ) that with probability ≥ 1 − δ, terminates before using
Tc(δ) queries to O and returns the best-arm index i∗ = 1. Suppose that we also know Tc(δ). Then,
for any positive integer T , we can construct an algorithm Ab(T ) that returns i∗ = 1 with probability
≥ minδ∈(0,1) exp
(−⌊T/Tc(δ)⌋D(12‖δ)) using at most T queries to O, where D(p‖q) is the relative
entropy between Bernoulli random variables with bias p and q.
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Proof. Since Tc(δ) is known, consider the modified version of the fixed-confidence algorithm where
the algorithm is forced to halt and return some blank symbol “⊥” if the running time exceeds
Tc(δ). We refer to the modified algorithm as A
′
c(δ). A
′
c(δ) returns the best-arm index i
∗ = 1 with
probability ≥ 1− δ and returns some symbol in {2, . . . , n,⊥} with probability ≤ δ.
For any T , we construct Ab(T ) as follows. Pick some δ ∈ (0, 1), run A′c(δ) m := ⌊T/Tc(δ)⌋
times, and take a majority vote over the outcomes. The failure probability can be upper bounded
by the probability that i∗ is observed fewer than m/2 times. The Chernoff bound upper bounds
the latter probability by exp(−mD(12‖δ)) = exp
(−⌊T/Tc(δ)⌋D(12‖δ)). But δ was arbitrary, so we
can take the δ that minimizes this upper bound.
As a direct corollary of Theorem 4 and Lemma 6, we see that when H (therefore Tc) is known
in advance, for sufficiently large T , there is a quantum algorithm using at most T queries that
returns the best-arm with probability ≥ 1− exp(−Ω(T/√H)).
D Proof details of the quantum lower bound
D.1 Proof of Theorem 6
For convenience, we reproduce the statement of the result:
Theorem 6. Let p ∈ (0, 1/2). For arbitrary biases pi ∈ [p, 1 − p], any quantum algorithm that
identifies the best arm requires Ω(
√
H) queries to the multi-armed bandit oracle O.
Proof. We use the adversary method (see Appendix A) and consider the following n different multi-
armed bandit oracles.
In the 1st bandit, we assign bias pi to arm i. Let η > 0 be a constant to be determined later.
In the xth bandit, x ∈ {2, . . . , n}, we assign bias p′1 := p1 + η to arm x and pi to arm i for all
i 6= x. A best-arm identification algorithm must output arm x on assignment x for all x ∈ [n] with
probability ≥ 1− δ.
Following the adversary method, we consider the sum
sk :=
∑
x>1
1
∆′2x
〈ψ(k)x |ψ(k)1 〉 (D.1)
for x ∈ [n], where ∆′x := p′1 − px. Clearly
s0 =
∑
x>1
1
∆′2x
. (D.2)
We also have
sT ≤
∑
x>1
1
∆′2x
· 2
√
δ(1 − δ). (D.3)
Next, we bound the difference |sk+1 − sk|. For i > 1, we let
Ai :=

√1− pi √pi√
pi −
√
1− pi

 , (D.4)
while
A1 :=

√1− p′1 √p′1√
p′1 −
√
1− p′1

 , (D.5)
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where we recall p′1 = p1 + η by definition.
Now, let us write
|ψ(k)x 〉 =
∑
z,i,b
αx,z,i,b |z, i, b〉 , |ψ(k)1 〉 =
∑
z,i,b
α1,z,i,b |z, i, b〉 . (D.6)
Then
|ψ(k+1)x 〉 = Ox |ψ(k)x 〉 =
∑
z,b
αx,z,x,b |z, x〉A1 |b〉+
∑
i 6=x
∑
z,b
αx,z,i,b |z, i〉Ai |b〉 (D.7)
and similarly
|ψ(k+1)1 〉 = O1 |ψ(k)1 〉 =
∑
z,b
α1,z,x,b |z, x〉Ax |b〉+
∑
i 6=x
∑
z,b
α1,z,i,b |z, i〉Ai |b〉 . (D.8)
Then
|sk+1 − sk| ≤
∑
x>1
1
∆′2x
∣∣∣〈ψ(k)x | O†xO1 |ψ(k)1 〉 − 〈ψ(k)x |ψ(k)1 〉∣∣∣ . (D.9)
Using (D.7) and (D.8), and after cancellations, we find that
〈ψ(k)x | O†xO1 |ψ(k)1 〉 − 〈ψ(k)x |ψ(k)1 〉 =
∑
z,b,b′
α∗x,z,x,bα1,z,x,b′ 〈b| (A†1Ax − I) |b′〉 . (D.10)
With(
ux vx
−vx ux
)
:= A†1Ax − I
=


√
(1− p′1)(1 − px) +
√
p′1px − 1
√
(1− p′1)px −
√
p′1(1 − px)
−√(1− p′1)px +√p′1(1− px) √(1− p′1)(1− px) +√p′1px − 1

 ,
(D.11)
we have
|sk+1 − sk| ≤
∑
x>1
∑
z,b
|ux|
∆′2x
|αx,z,x,b| |α1,z,x,b|+
∑
x>1
∑
z,b6=b′
|vx|
∆′2x
|αx,z,x,b|
∣∣α1,z,x,b′∣∣ . (D.12)
Clearly, |ux| = 1−
√
(1− p′1)(1− px)−
√
p′1px ≤ 1− (1− p′1)− px = p′1 − px = ∆′x. It can also
be seen that |vx| ≤ ∆′x/c(p−η), where c(x) := 2
√
x(1− x) is a monotone increasing function when
x ∈ [0, 1/2]. For completeness, we prove the latter inequality as an auxiliary Lemma 7 immediately
after this proof.
We can establish the following bounds using Cauchy-Schwarz:
∑
x>1
∑
z,b
|ux|
∆′2x
|αx,z,x,b| |α1,z,x,b| ≤
√√√√ ∑
x>1,z,b
|ux|2
∆′4x
|αx,z,x,b|2 ·
√ ∑
x>1,z,b
|α1,z,x,b|2
≤
√∑
x>1
1
∆′2x
(D.13)
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and
∑
x>1
∑
z,b6=b′
|vx|
∆′2x
|αx,z,x,b|
∣∣α1,z,x,b′∣∣ =∑
b6=b′
∑
x>1,z
|vx|
∆′2x
|αx,z,x,b|
∣∣α1,z,x,b′∣∣
≤
∑
b6=b′
√√√√∑
x>1,z
|vx|2
∆′4x
|αx,z,x,b|2 ·
√∑
x>1,z
∣∣α1,z,x,b′∣∣2
≤ 2
c(p− η)
√∑
x>1
1
∆′2x
.
(D.14)
Therefore, we find that
|sk+1 − sk| ≤
(
1 +
2
c(p− η)
)√∑
x>1
1
∆′2x
. (D.15)
Hence, from Eqs. (D.2), (D.3), and (D.15), we find that
T ≥ 1− 2
√
δ(1 − δ)
1 + 2/c(p − η)
√∑
x>1
1
∆′2x
. (D.16)
We then set η = p(p1 − p2)/2. Now, it can be seen that
c(p− η) = c
((
1− p1 − p2
2
)
p
)
≥ c(p/2) (D.17)
because p ≤ 1/2 and p1 − p2 ≤ 1. Moreover, for x > 1,
∆′x = p1 + η − px =
p
2
(p1 − p2) + (p1 − px) ≤
(
1 +
p
2
)
(p1 − px) ≤ 5
4
∆x (D.18)
because px ≤ p2 and p ≤ 1/2. Therefore, we find that
T ≥ 4
5
· 1− 2
√
δ(1 − δ)
1 + 2/c(p/2)
√∑
x>1
1
∆2x
, (D.19)
and hence T = Ω
(√∑n
i=2
1
∆2i
)
.
Lemma 7. Suppose that p1, p2 ∈ [p, 1− p] where 0 < p ≤ 1/2. Then
|
√
(1− p1)p2 −
√
(1− p2)p1| ≤ |p1 − p2|
2
√
p(1− p) , (D.20)
and the term in the denominator is optimal.
Proof. Note that
√
(1− p1)p2 −
√
(1− p2)p1 = (1− p1)p2 − (1− p2)p1√
(1− p1)p2 +
√
(1− p2)p1
(D.21)
=
−(p1 − p2)√
(1− p1)p2 +
√
(1− p2)p1
. (D.22)
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Therefore, it suffices to prove√
(1− p1)p2 +
√
(1− p2)p1 ≥ 2
√
p(1− p). (D.23)
Since p1, p2 ∈ [p, 1− p], we have
(p1 − p)(p1 − (1− p)) ≤ 0 (D.24)
(p2 − p)(p2 − (1− p)) ≤ 0 (D.25)
|2p1 − 1| ≤ 1− 2p (D.26)
|2p2 − 1| ≤ 1− 2p. (D.27)
Eqs. (D.24) and (D.25) are equivalent to
p1 − p21 ≥ p(1− p), p2 − p22 ≥ p(1− p). (D.28)
Eqs. (D.26) and (D.27) imply
4p1p2 − 2p1 − 2p2 + 1 = (2p1 − 1)(2p2 − 1) ≤ (2p − 1)2 = 4p2 − 4p+ 1, (D.29)
which gives
p1 + p2 − 2p1p2 ≥ 2p− 2p2. (D.30)
Now, we have
(√
(1− p1)p2 +
√
(1− p2)p1
)2
= (1− p1)p2 + (1− p2)p1 + 2
√
(1− p1)p2(1− p2)p1 (D.31)
= p1 + p2 − 2p1p2 + 2
√
p1(1− p1)
√
p2(1− p2) (D.32)
≥ 2p− 2p2 + 2p(1− p) = (2
√
p(1− p))2, (D.33)
where the inequality comes from (D.28) and (D.30). Therefore, we have established (D.23). Note
that this is optimal as taking p1 = p2 = p makes the two sides in (D.23) equal.
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